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I. INTRODUCTION
This symposium explores the economic approach to intellec-
tual property law. This Article concerns a particular type of intel-
lectual good-personal data. Personal data is an increasingly im-
portant topic because of its connection to the issue of Internet pri-
vacy, which has recently taken center stage in the public policy
arena. 1
Boiled down to its core, the Internet privacy debate is a de-
bate about who should control personal data-Internet users (data
subjects) or websites. The scope of website data collection practices
is expanding dramatically, due in large part to technological ad-
vances such as cookies, Web-crawlers, and Web-cams. 2 If Internet
* I wish to gratefully acknowledge the expert research assistance of Kimberly Gilman,
Janet Hirt, and Catherine Hora. I wish to thank Erin O'Hara and Robert Rasmussen for helpful
discussion of ideas contained in the Article.
1. See P3P: Just a Start, EWEEK FROM ZDWIRE, July 17, 2000, available at 2000 WL
18178259 (There's no disputing that privacy has emerged as a leading issue of the Internet
age.").
2. An industry has emerged to market a variety of software products designed to assist
websites in collecting and analyzing visitor data and in providing targeted advertising. See, e.g.,
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users are unable to exert control over this growing use of their data
by commercial entities, their personal privacy will be increasingly
diminished.
One proposed solution to the growing privacy problem is to
grant people intellectual property rights in their personal data.
Rights of this sort would, however, create tension with other princi-
ples of intellectual property law. 3 Furthermore, property rights in
personal data also raise First Amendment concerns. 4
Thus far, new attempts to regulate personal data have
stopped short of granting property in this data. Instead, the Federal
Trade Commission ("FTC"), the leading regulator of personal data
up to the present time, has proceeded by means of protecting user
control, as opposed to ownership, of the user's personal data.5 In
particular, the FTC has attempted to provide visitors to websites
with greater control over the circumstances under which their data
is collected and used by websites. The FTC's main means to accom-
plish this is to promote the use of so-called "privacy policies" or
Rivka Tadjer, Following the Patron Path, ZD INTERNET MAGAZINE, Dec. 1997, at 95; Thomas E.
Weber, Software Lets Marketers Target Web Ads, WALL ST. J., Apr. 21, 1997, at B1.
3. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 359-60 (1991) (holding
that bits of data are uncopyrightable unless they are selected, coordinated, or arranged in an
original way). Law regarding personal data, indeed all data, is at sea. Some commentators have
argued for heightened intellectual property status for personal data as a means to greater pri-
vacy protection. See Patricia Mell, Seeking Shade in a Land of Perpetual Sunlight.: Privacy as
Property in the Electronic Wilderness, 11 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 78 (1996) (advocating statutory
recognition of property rights in a "persona" consisting of personal information about the indi-
vidual); Kenneth C. Laudon, Markets and Privacy, COMMS. ACM, Sept. 1996, at 92, available at
1996 WL 9011971 (suggesting property rights in personal data as a way to protect privacy).
4. Courts have recognized that the sale of personal information to third parties is accorded
the same level of protection as "commercial speech." See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758-59 & n.5 (1985) (plurality opinion); Trans Union Corp., FTC,
No. 9255, slip op. at 33-37 (Feb. 10, 2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/osl2000/03/trans-
unionfiord.htm. For a discussion of the First Amendment and privacy, compare Paul 1M.
Schwartz, Free Speech vs. Privacy: Eugene Volokh's First Amendment Jurisprudence, 52 STAN. L.
REV. 1559 (2000), with Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Trou-
bling Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049
(2000).
5. The tension between privacy and free speech can be avoided if data-subject control, as
opposed to ownership, of personal data, can be protected. A trend leading in an opposite direc-
tion from heightened intellectual property protection is "copyleft," which argues that the Internet
radically undermines ownership concepts for intellectual goods in the online world. See Ira V.
Heffan, Copyleft: Licensing Collaborative Works in the Digital Age, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1487, 1491-
92 (1997). See generally DAVID BRIN, THE TRANSPARENT SOCIETY: WILL TECHNOLOGY FORCE US
TO CHOOSE BETWEEN PRIVACY AND FREEDOM? (1998) (arguing that personal data should be sub-
ject to open access rules).
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"tprivacy statements" by websites.6 The FTC has met with a fair de-
gree of success in encouraging websites to adopt privacy policies. In
the past few years, the percentage of websites that offer privacy
policies has gone up significantly.7
Nevertheless, the FTC's efforts have been met with skepti-
cism from the well-organized, public-interest advocacy community
that is active in promoting greater electronic privacy protection.8
The main thrust of the criticism is that the FTC's approach is
doomed because privacy policies are not an adequate means to ac-
complish the task of protecting website visitors from the invasive
6. Privacy policies are written statements of company practices with respect to the treat-
ment of personal data of website visitors. Privacy policies are usually posted as a link from a
website home page and from subsequent pages where data is requested.
7. See FTC, PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES IN THE ELECTRONIC
MARKErPLACE, A REPORT TO CONGRESS 10-11 (May 2000), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy2000/privacy2000.pdf [hereinafter FAIR INFORMATION
PRACTICES] (discussing FTC empirical studies of the use of privacy policies by websites). The
FTC reports:
The results of the 1999 GIPPS Report showed a significant increase over the
previous year in the percent of Web sites posting at least one privacy disclo-
sure-i.e., either a unified privacy policy or a discrete information practice
statement (such as, "This is a secure order form"). Sixty-six percent of Web
sites in the GIPPS random sample, compared with 14% of Web sites in the
Commission's 1998 Comprehensive Sample, had such disclosures. This year,
the Commission's Survey findings demonstrate continued improvement on this
front, with 88% of Web sites in the Random Sample posting at least one privacy
disclosure. Of sites in the Random Sample that collect personal identifying in-
formation, 90% post at least one privacy disclosure. All of the sites in the Most
Popular Group post at least one privacy disclosure, compared with 93% of the
sites in Professor Culnan's 1999 survey of the 100 busiest sites, and 71% in the
Commission's 1998 Most Popular Sample. The weighted analysis figure is 96%.
The percent of sites displaying a privacy policy (as opposed to a discrete in-
formation practice statement) has also continued to increase. Sixty-two percent
of sites in the Random Sample (compared with 44% in the 1999 GIPPS survey)
and 97% of sites in the Most Popular Group (compared with 81% in the 1999
OPA survey) post a privacy policy. The weighted analysis figure is 82%. Figure
1 demonstrates the progress Web sites have made in posting any disclosures
about their information practices since the Commission's 1998 Report was is-
sued.
Id. at 10.
8. See Communications Privacy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual
Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of Marc Rotenberg,
Director, Electronic Privacy Information Center), available at 1998 WL 18089917. According to
the congressional testimony of Marc Rotenberg:
To be effective, Fair Information Practices must be enforced and must pro-
vide redress. It is not enough to say what a policy is without providing a means
to enforce the policy. That is why voluntary guidelines, professional standards,
and codes of conduct that are based on Fair Information Practices do not neces-
sarily provide significant privacy protection ...
In my view, privacy in the information age means both the extension of Fair
Information Practices to new information environments and the active promo-
tion of techniques, often based on encryption, to protect the disclosure of per-
sonal information. This is the fundamental policy goal.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
practices of websites. Yet, the FTC persists in promoting privacy
policies as its primary instrument of reform. This raises a puzzle as
to why the FTC would focus its efforts so heavily on privacy policies
when they may be of dubious value.
The suspicion is naturally raised that the Agency is either
incompetent or is in the pocket of the increasingly powerful online
industry. Indeed, some critics have charged that talk of the ethos of
self-regulation of the Internet is simply a ruse whereby this power-
ful industry will come to completely dominate the personal data of
the consuming public, with the result that individual informational
privacy will completely disappear. 9 This important charge calls for
a closer look into the FTC's efforts to promote online privacy by
means of privacy policies. In the following analysis, a public choice
approach will be used to model the FTC's activities, with the hope
of better understanding what may really be motivating their policy
choices. 10
Public choice theory models government agencies as if they
were businesses, and key government actors as if they were entre-
preneurs. Whereas typical businesses seek to maximize their profit,
agencies seek to maximize their power, size, and prestige." There
are different activities an entrepreneur can engage in. In his classic
study, Richard Posner analyzed the FTC as a provider of preferen-
tial treatment to important members of Congress who serve on
committees that oversee the agency.12 This typically involves fa-
9. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 142-63 (1999) (de-
scribing how private interests will propertize computer code, leading to privacy threat by e-
commerce).
10. Beginning with Richard Posner's early work based on his experiences working at the
FTC, the Agency has received a good deal of attention from public choice theorists. See generally
PUBLIC CHOICE & REGULATION: A VIEW FROM INSIDE THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 4 (Robert
J. Mackay et al. eds., 1987) [hereinafter PUBLIC CHOICE & REGULATION] (providing a collection of
articles focusing on "systematic influence on the agency's behavior of external factors such as
Congress, the executive branch, and interest groups-[on the one hand,] and internal forces-
such as organizational structure and incentives" on the other hand); Richard A. Posner, The
Federal Trade Commission, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 47 (1969). With the more traditional approach,
the so-called "bureaucratic" approach, agencies such as the FTC are considered to be
independent of the legislature. See Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic
Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission,
91 J. POL. ECON. 765, 766-67 (1983) [hereinafter Weingast & Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion];
see also Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control?
Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, in PUBLIC CHOICE & REGULATION,
supra, at 30-55.
11. See Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1,
47 (1982). But see Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political
Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 90 (1985).
12. See Posner, supra note 10, at 82-83. Posner observed that each member of Congress
seeks to protect and further the interests of the citizens of his district or state and that these
2044 [Vol. 53:6:2041
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voring those industries or companies found in the Committee mem-
bers' districts or states.'3 Bureaucrats may engage in selective en-
forcement or they may engage in non-enforcement. Others have ar-
gued that the Agency seeks to curry favor with the executive
branch, which controls the power of appointment with regard to key
agency posts, as well as having a role in the budgetary process. 14
The present question is, what is the FTC seeking to promote when
it promotes privacy policies? Is it promoting the interests of some
companies located in the district of important committee members,
or something else?
It is increasingly true for many businesses that they either
develop an Internet business strategy or risk extinction. While it is
unlikely that the FTC would cease to exist, nevertheless, it too
must adapt to the emerging Internet economy. 15 I will argue that
the FTC's recent actions are revealingly viewed as its attempt to
develop a business model that encompasses the Internet.
Purportedly out of its sensitivity to the Internet ethos of self-
regulation, the FTC has thus far attempted to guide self-regulatory
efforts by the website industry rather than issuing a detailed set of
rules to precisely control industry behavior.' 6 In particular, the FTC
interests will often conflict with the overall public interest. See id. Because the power to influ-
ence the FTC is unevenly distributed among members of Congress, a member of a committee
that oversees the FTC may exert "a great deal of power to advance the interests of businesses
located in his district, however unimportant the interests may be from a national standpoint." Id.
at 83.
13. See Roger L. Faith et al., Antitrust Pork Barrel, 25 J.L. & ECON. 329, 336-37, 340-41
(1982) (providing an empirical study of FTC case-bringing activity demonstrating that favorable
decisions tend to be non-randomly concentrated on firms headquartered in the home districts of
those members of the House of Representatives who are on committees and subcommittees with
budgetary and oversight responsibilities over the FTC).
A See William E. Kovacic, The Federal Trade Commission and Congressional Oversight of
Antitrust Enforcement. A Historical Perspective, in PUBLIc CHOICE & REGULATION, supra note
10, at 63, 76 (The [P]resident and Congress share responsibility for selecting commissioners, but
the President has historically been the dominant force in choosing the FTCs leadership."). In
addition to the appointment process, the executive branch can influence the FTCs activities
through the budget process. See id. at 108-09 n.126.
15. In an incident that has been frequently discussed in the public choice literature, the
FTC did practically stop functioning for a time, due to the fact that Congress, displeased with the
Agency's enforcement activities, dried up its funding. See Weingast & Moran, Bureaucratic Dis-
cretion, supra note 10, at 775.
16. See FTC, SELF REGULATION AND PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 6, 12-14
(July 1999), available at http'J/www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9907/privacy99.pdf [hereinafter SELF
REGULATION]. The Federal Trade Commission has stated that, "self-regulation is the least intru-
sive and most efficient means to ensure fair information practices, given the rapidly evolving
nature of the Internet and computer technology." Id. at 6. Numerous commentators have taken
the view that since the Internet is growing so rapidly and successfully, it is sensible to be cau-
tious before adopting any significant regulatory measures that might curtail this development.
See, e.g., I. Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for "Cyberspace," 55 U. PITT. L REv. 993,
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has sought to incentivize the industry to adopt more respectful pri-
vacy norms of online behavior.17 Thus, the FTC can be described as
a website privacy "norm entrepreneur."18 I will argue that there is a
good public choice explanation for the FTC's actions, which is that
promoting privacy policies allows the Agency to sink its jurisdic-
tional hooks more firmly into the Internet privacy debate, and
therefore the Internet.
Part Two below presents a brief account of the FTC's recent
actions to promote privacy policies, seeking to explain the Agency's
norm-shaping behavior in informal game-theoretic terms. Part
Three offers a public choice explanation for the Agency's demon-
strated preference for privacy policies, as the preferred means to
shape website privacy norms. Finally, Part Four concludes with a
consideration of the normative implications of the positive analysis,
specifically, whether the FTC's actions are best viewed as serving
the public interest, as an instance of pork barrel politics, or as
something else altogether.
II. THE FTC AS PRIVACY POLICY NORM ENTREPRENEUR
In 1995, the FTC was asked by Congress to investigate the
privacy risks associated with computer databases. The Agency has
been increasingly involved with electronic privacy issues ever since.
It has held workshops to bring industry participants together with
privacy advocates in an attempt to encourage self-regulation. 9 It
has set up a website to provide consumers with information on in-
dustry data-gathering practices, and to instruct consumers on
1054 (1994) (contending that rules of conduct in cyberspace should be governed by a presumption
of decentralization, and noting that because the Internet is changing so rapidly, "the first answer
to how a legal problem in cyberspace should be solved is to do nothing'); Henry H. Perritt, Jr.,
Cyberspace Self-Government: Town Hall Democracy or Rediscovered Royalism?, 12 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 413, 419-20 (1997) (contending that as a general rule "self-governance is desirable for
electronic communities").
17. See infra text accompanying notes 29-33.
18. A norm entrepreneur is simply an individual or entity that seeks to promote or change a
norm. See Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. IL REV. 903, 909 (1996).
In its everyday use, the word "entrepreneur" applies to someone in business, usually a principal
in the business. By the lights of economic analysis, all actors are entrepreneurs in the sense that
all actors seek to maximize something, whether it be a private firm seeking to maximize profit or
a public-interest privacy advocate seeking to maximize the aggregate level of individual privacy
throughout society.
19. See FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES, supra note 7, at 5.
[Vol. 53:6:20412046
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measures they may take to be proactive about protecting their indi-
vidual privacy.20
By far, however, the greatest amount of attention has been
toward promoting the emergence of an industry-wide practice of
establishing website privacy policies. The FTC has made the web-
site industry aware that the Agency views privacy policies as a key
element of self-regulation. 21 In 1998, the FTC threatened to recom-
mend to Congress that it enact privacy legislation, if more respect-
ful industry customs and usages were not forthcoming through in-
dustry self-regulation. 22 The threat was highly credible because of
the Commission's recent success in influencing privacy legislation
with respect to the collection of personal data from children.23 This
threat appears to have had a tremendous impact on the website in-
dustry, causing many firms to alter their behavior. In its 1999 Re-
port to Congress, the FTC notes that the number of sites offering
privacy policies has jumped significantly. 24 This is particularly true
for larger, more-visited sites.25
In modeling the rational structure of the website practices
that the FTC seeks to influence, there are three relevant time peri-
ods to consider: (1) the time prior to the FTC's threat, (2) the time
after the FTC's threat, and (3) the time after the large websites
threaten the small websites. The strategic structure of each of these
time periods will be modeled in the following three game payoff ma-
trices below. The goal is to demonstrate that the FTC has been rela-
tively successful in raising the level of industry provision of privacy
policies.
20. See FTC, Privacy Initiatives, http:lwww.ftc.gov/privacy/index.html (n.d.) (providing
FTC's Online Privacy Protection information) [hereinafter Privacy Initiatives].
21. See FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES, supra note 7, at 5-6.
22. See FTC, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 43 (June 1998), available at
http:/lwww.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/priv.23a.pdf [hereinafter PRIVACY ONLINE].
23. See id. at 4-6. In 1998, after finding self-regulation of children's online privacy to be in-
adequate, the FTC recommended to Congress that it enact legislation, which Congress quickly
did, enacting the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506 (1994 &
Supp. IV 1998). On October 21, 1998, the President signed into law the Children's Online Pri-
vacy Protection Act of 1998 C'COPPA"). See id. The stated goals of the Act are: "(1) to enhance
parental involvement in a child's online activities in order to protect the privacy of children in
the online environment; (2).. . to help protect the safety of children in online fora such as cha-
trooms, home pages, and pen-pal services in which children may make public postings of identi-
fying information; (3) to maintain the security of personally identifiable information of children
collected online; and (4) to ... limit[ ] the collection of personal information from children with-
out parental consent." 144 Cong. Rec. S 11657 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998) (statement of Sen. Bryan).
24. See SELF REGULATION, supra note 16, at 7-8.
25. See FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES, supra note 7, at 5. The 1999 Georgetown University
Privacy Policy Survey examined the most heavily trafficked and busiest sites on the World Wide
Web, and found significant improvement in the frequency of privacy disclosures. See id.
2047
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Figure 1 represents the strategic structure of the situation
faced by the various members of the website industry. The south-
east cell represents the situation in which no websites are providing
privacy policies. Note that each website does better in this circum-
stance than where all websites are providing privacy policies
(northwest cell), that is, each website receives an outcome of 2
rather than 3.26
Website Industry
Privacy No Privacy
Policy Policy
Privacy Policy 33 4,1
Firm A
No Privacy Policy 1,4 2,2
Figure 1: Website Industry Before Threat
When the non-cooperative outcome, 2,2, is obtained, each
website can change its practices regarding personal data at will
without worrying about breaching obligations to website users. This
is a significant benefit to websites not providing privacy policies. It
is surely not outweighed by an amorphous and speculative promise
of greater consumer willingness to participate in electronic com-
merce, as is sometimes claimed. 27
The next payoff matrix represents the situation in which the
FTC begins its attempt to incentivize the website industry to adopt
privacy policies.
26. The numbers 1-4 in the matrices represent the ordinal preferences of the players, with 1
being the most preferred outcome and 4 being the least preferred outcome. With each pair, the
left-hand number is the payoff for the row player, and the right-hand number is the payoff for
the column player.
27. In its 1999 Report to Congress, the FTC stated that, "[t]he Commission's efforts have
been based on the belief that greater protection of personal privacy on the Web will not only
benefit consumers, but also benefit industry by increasing consumer confidence and ultimately
their participation in the online marketplace." SELF REGULATION, supra note 16, at 3. In his
recent testimony before Congress, Marc Rotenberg made a similar assertion: "Users of web-based
services and operators of web-based services have a common interest in promoting good privacy
practices. Strong privacy standards provide assurance that personal information will not be
misused, and should encourage the development of on-line commerce." Electronic Communica-
tions Privacy Policy Disclosures: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Prop-
erty of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Marc Rotenberg,
Director, Electronic Privacy Information Center), available at http://www.house.govljud-
iciary/roteO527.htm.
2048
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Small & Privacy Policy
Medium
Web- No Privacy
sites Policy
Large Websites
No Privacy
Privacy Policy PoicyPolicy
3,1 4,2
1,1 2,2
Figure 2: Website Industry Practices at T2 with Four Fair Practice Principles
Figure 2 represents the situation in which the FTC has
promulgated the fair information practice principles ("FIPPS"),
which require the adoption of privacy policies for their implementa-
tion.
The FTC justifies its promotion of privacy policies because
they promote these second-order privacy norms while also allowing
scope for self-regulation. 28 The FIPPs are: "(1) Notice/Awareness; (2)
Choice/Consent; (3) Access/Participation; (4) Integrity/Security; and
(5) Enforcement/Redress." 29
Many large websites do better for promoting the fair practice
principles than for not respecting them, regardless of what the
small or medium websites do. They receive 1, representing their
most preferred outcome, in the northwest and southwest cells. They
28. See SELF REGULATION, supra note 16, at 3. The agency's explanation of its actions can
be treated with the same skepticism as the public explanations offered by any business for its
actions. Such explanations are meant to maximize profit, not candor, and should be treated ac-
cordingly. See PUBLIC CHOICE & REGULATION, supra note 10, at 3-4.
29. SELF REGULATION, supra note 16, at 3. The FTC considers:
The Notice/Awareness principle [to be] the most fundamental: consumers
must be given notice of a company's information practices before personal in-
formation is collected from them. The scope and content of the notice will vary
with a company's substantive information practices, but the notice itself is es-
sential. The other core principles have meaning only if a consumer has notice of
an entity's information practices and his or her rights with respect thereto.
... The Choice/Consent principle requires that consumers be given options
with respect to whether and how personal information collected from them may
be used. The Access/Participation principle requires that consumers be given
reasonable access to information collected about them and the ability to contest
that data's accuracy and completeness. The Integrity/Security principle re-
quires that companies take reasonable steps to assure that information col-
lected from consumers is accurate and secure from unauthorized use. Finally,
the effectiveness of the foregoing privacy protections is dependent upon imple-
mentation of the Enforcement/Redress principle, which requires governmental
and/or self-regulatory mechanisms to impose sanctions for noncompliance with
fair information practices.
Id. at 3-4.
2049
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receive the same payoff in each of these boxes, indicating their rela-
tive indifference to the actions of the small and medium websites. It
is enough for the large sites that each of them benefits individually
from conforming. This rationale is plausible. These sites are very
prominent and they would run the risk of coming under FTC scru-
tiny were they to fail to make a respectable effort to show respect
for user privacy as dictated by the fair information practice princi-
ples.
In contrast, the small and medium websites have a domi-
nating preference to not provide privacy policies. They receive a
more preferable outcome in either of the southern cells (1 over 3 in
the western cells, or 2 over 4 in the eastern cells, respectively). The
small and medium websites are not neutral as to what the large
websites do. Rather, it is plausible to suppose that they prefer that
the major sites conform to privacy respecting practices, as this will
be conducive to favorable conditions for the smaller sites, since
there will both be less public clamoring for greater privacy protec-
tion, and more personal data available for the taking, due to fewer
takers and a more trusting public. Accordingly, they receive their
more preferred outcome in the southwest as compared to the south-
east cell, that is, 1, as compared to 2. Note that the southwest cell is
an equilibrium for both the large sites and the small and medium
sites; that is, given the choices of others, no one could unilaterally
do better.30
Consider next the situation in which the FTC issues a threat
to the website industry. The major websites are no longer indiffer-
ent to the actions of the smaller sites, for the failure of these sites
to adopt privacy respecting practices might lead to privacy legisla-
tion that would adversely affect all websites, but particularly the
large sites, as they have the most to lose from onerous legislative
requirements. This situation is represented by the following payoff
matrix.
30. When it is possible for at least one player to do better and no one to do worse, the
changed situation would be Pareto superior.
2050 [Vol. 53:6:2041
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Large Websites
Privacy Policy No Privacy Policy
Small & Privacy Policy 3,1 4,3
MediumWebsites Privacy 1,2 2,4
Policy
Figure 3: Website Industry Practices After Threat
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Note that there is no longer a stable equilibrium in this
situation. Large sites most prefer the northwest cell while small
and medium sites prefer the southwest cell. In contrast to the pre-
vious situation in Figure 2, the large sites now prefer that the small
and medium sites respect privacy. This is because the FTC has
made it clear that it expects industry-wide improvement and that if
this is not forthcoming, a statute will be. Faced with this situation,
large sites have devised means to bring small and medium sites
into conformity with more respectful data-collection practices. Most
important, large sites are threatening to withhold advertising from
sites that do not respect privacy.31
In the case of the threat by large websites to withhold adver-
tising, there is no dependence on repeat interaction. Even if the
small websites only interact once with Microsoft or IBM, they will
typically prefer that this interaction allow for advertising rather
than that it not. The bestowing of advertising is functioning like a
"Iselective incentive" that rewards cooperative behavior on an indi-
vidual basis. 32
The threat of these large sites is having the desired result,
as an increasing number of small and medium sites are offering
privacy policies. 33 Indeed, as indicated by the FTC's 1999 and 2000
31. See SELF REGULATION, supra note 16, at 12-13 CCompanies like IBM, Microsoft and
Disney, which have recently announced, among other things, that they will forego advertising on
sites that do not adhere to fair information practices are to be commended for their efforts, which
we hope will be emulated by their colleagues.").
32. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF
GROUPS, 51, 133-34 (1971). Selective incentives allow the party seeking to incentivize conformity
to be able to provide incentives to individuals in order to elicit their conformity. This is in con-
trast to the collective good itself, which, by definition, has the feature that the good is public,
that is, when provided for one, it is provided for all, and thus is open to free riding. See id. at 98-
102.
33. See FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES, supra note 7, at 10-11. The FTC writes: "These
types of business-based initiatives are critical to making self-regulation meaningful because they
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Reports to Congress, website provision of privacy policies has gone
up dramatically. The Commission's 2000 Survey examined the
change in frequency of Privacy Disclosures on websites from 1998 to
2000. 34 The results showed that in 1998, 14 percent of randomly
sampled websites had privacy policies as compared to 88 percent in
2000. 35 In a survey of the most popular websites, 71 percent had
privacy policies in 1998 compared to 100% in 2000.36 We see, then,
that the FTC is able to indirectly promote its goal of data privacy by
getting large websites to do its bidding.
As the preceding discussion has shown, then, the FTC has
played an important role as a privacy policy norm entrepreneur.
This result is a vindication of Cass Sunstein's well-known argument
that the government may play a pivotal role as a norm entrepre-
neur.37 There is a larger political point in Sunstein's characteriza-
tion of governmental actors as norm entrepreneurs, which is that
doing so serves to highlight the potential role of the state in what
Sunstein refers to as "norm management."38 This itself is a reaction
against a libertarian strain in norms theory, which highlights the
possibility that informal social norms may emerge through basically
private social processes, thereby making the state's role peripheral.
Sunstein, who is a bigger believer in the power of the state to do
good than is Robert Ellickson,39 is intent to show that even in the
context of informal social norms, the state may nevertheless play a
productive role as a norm entrepreneur, undertaking to manage
norms. With Internet privacy norms, the story is a complex inter-
play of informal ordering forces of a sort Elickson favors, and gov-
ernmental forces of a sort Sunstein favors. 40
can extend the reach of privacy protection to small and medium-sized businesses where there is
great potential for e-commerce growth." SELF REGULATION, supra note 16, at 13.
34. See FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES, supra note 7, at 10-11.
35. See id. at 11.
36. See id. In the FTCs 1999 Report, it stated "[tihe results of two new surveys of commer-
cial Web sites suggest that online businesses are providing significantly more notice of their
information practices than they were last year. In addition, several significant and promising
self-regulatory programs, including privacy seal programs, are underway." SELF REGULATION,
supra note 16, at 6; see also supra note 7.
37. See Sunstein, supra note 18, at 913.
38. See id. at 907.
39. See ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 138-
47 (1991).
40. Elsewhere, I develop a three-stage emergence account of these norms, the second stage
of which is the role played by the FTC. I argue that the FTC has succeeded in effectuating a
"norm shock" to the equilibrium of privacy-related website practices. The reverberations of the
FTC's norm shock are still being felt by the website industry. We are in the midst of a "norm
cascade," caused by the norm shock. The result is that more respectful privacy practices among
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III. PUBLIC CHOICE EXPLANATION FOR THE FTC'S NORM
ENTREPRENEURSHIP
As discussed in Part Two, the FTC claims to promote privacy
policies because they are the best concrete means to instantiate the
fair information practice principles. In considering these principles,
one might fairly wonder why they are characterized as "fair" infor-
mation principles. The FTC is seemingly engaged in persuasive
definition, as it is certainly not obvious that fairness is the abstract
normative term that unites these various second-level norms. The
FTC says nothing of a substantial nature to explain how each of the
principles promotes fairness. Other privacy norm entrepreneurs
have not, in general, conceived of the debate in terms of fairness.
The explanation very likely has something to do with the fact
that Section 5 of the FTC Act allows the FTC authority over "un-
fair" trade practices. 41 By setting out the website privacy issue in
terms of fairness, the Agency puts itself in a position to determine
whether websites are acting fairly by the lights of the fair informa-
tion practice principles. While the Agency may in general promul-
gate rules for website activities and may bring enforcement
actions, 42 it has apparently chosen not to issue specific rules for
website activities. Instead, the Agency has outlined the fair infor-
mation practice principles listed above, which are more general in
scope than agency rules. The FTC explicitly left room for websites
to promote these second-order principles in a manner individually
tailored by the website to its specific situation.43
The Agency has provided very little information, however,
which would indicate the standards of fairness the Agency intends
websites are becoming an option for the Web surfing consumer, due to the software industrys
efforts to fill a new market niche for so-called "privacy solution" software, which has in part
opened up due to the FTCs activities. See Steven Hetcher, Self-Regulation of Privacy: The FTC's
Trojan Horse, 19.1 J. MARSHALL L. REV. (forthcoming 2000).
41. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (1994) CThe Commission is hereby empowered and directed to
prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations ... from using unfair methods of competition in or
affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.").
42. See id. § 45(b) (authorizing the agency to bring enforcement proceedings without pro-
viding further guidelines).
43. See PRIVACY ONLINE, supra note 22, at 41.
The Commission has encouraged industry to address consumer concerns re-
garding online privacy through self-regulation. The Internet is a rapidly
changing marketplace. Effective self-regulation remains desirable because it
allows firms to respond quickly to technological changes and employ new tech-
nologies to protect consumer privacy. Accordingly, a private-sector response to
consumer concerns that incorporates widely-accepted fair information practices
and provides for effective enforcement mechanisms could afford consumers ade-
quate privacy protection.
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to apply in determining which websites might fall below an accept-
able level. Websites thereby have had little guidance as to how
much is required of them in terms of providing notice, data secu-
rity, data access, and determining what constitutes consent.
As Part Two discussed, privacy policies have been the FTC's
primary response to the problem of invasion of informational pri-
vacy by websites. As the discussion indicated, the Agency has been
relatively successful in its effort to bring an increase in the per-
centage of sites that offer privacy policies. One might expect that
privacy advocates would have been cheering the FTC along in its
efforts. However, this has not been the case. Instead, privacy advo-
cates have criticized the FTC for focusing too much attention on
privacy policies. Leading privacy advocates have instead advocated
for a statute that would function to strictly control entities that
collect and use data, as does the European Union's Privacy Direc-
tive .4
By the Agency's lights, its promotion of the fair practice
principles should satisfy privacy advocates, as the fair information
practice principles are derived from pre-existing norms of the advo-
cacy community. Public interest advocates contend to the contrary,
however, that privacy policies ill serve their aspirational privacy
norms. 45 They argue that privacy policies are typically not read by
website users.46 They are written in legalese such that even if peo-
ple read them, they will not understand them. 47 Hence, they do not
provide notice and thus cannot lead to consent. In addition, there is
evidence that many sites do not adhere to their own policies.48 The
44. See PETER P. SWIRE & ROBERT E. LITAN, NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS: WORLD DATA
FLows, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, AND THE EUROPEAN PRIVACY DIRECTIvE 22, 45-49 (1998); see
also Fred H. Cate, The EU Data Protection Directive, Information Privacy, and the Public Inter-
est, 80 IOWA L. REv. 431, 438, 441-42 (1995).
45. See Daniel Tynan, Privacy 2000: In Web We Trust?, PC WORLD, Jun. 1, 2000, at 103,
available at 2000 WL 9395250. A research manager at International Data Corporation in
Framingham, Massachusetts stated that "[s]ix months ago, just having a privacy policy was
considered pretty honorable... [but] [today, most policies are pretty worthless." Id.
46. See Lawrence Lessig, Common Ground, MSN Slate Book Club, Jan. 19, 2000 at 13,
available at http://slate.msn.com/code/BookClublBookClub.asp?Show=1/19/00&idMessage=44-
15&idBio=139.
47. According to the third annual "Surfer Beware" report from the Electronic Privacy In-
formation Center ('CEPIC"), "the privacy policies available at many Web sites are typically con-
fusing, incomplete and inconsistent." Doug Bedell, Government Will Examine Internet Privacy
Concerns, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Mar. 27, 2000, at C01, available at 2000 WL 5389584.
48. See Tynan, supra note 45. "A study of 21 health advice sites ... sponsored by the Cali-
fornia Healthcare Foundation found that many sites share sensitive information, despite privacy
policies against the practice." Id. Its key finding was that, "[o]n a number of sites personally
identified information is collected through the use of cookies and banner advertisements by third
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policies are subject to change when companies merge, such that one
company's policy is likely to go unheeded. Finally, very few privacy
policies guarantee security or enforcement. 49 Thus, the provision of
a privacy policy by a website does not automatically promote the
fair practice principles.
Despite these problems, the FTC has strongly endorsed pri-
vacy policies. This raises a puzzle as to why the Agency should do
so, given the severe criticism privacy policies have received. Why,
for instance, is the FTC not coming out in support of the creation of
a new agency to oversee privacy protection? A number of countries
have begun to create positions of privacy director or agencies to
oversee privacy.50 Recently the Office of Management and Budget
("OMB") created a privacy oversight position with privacy law
scholar Peter Swire occupying the position.51 Why isn't the FTC in-
sisting that OMB's privacy-related responsibilities be enlarged?
There is a public choice answer as to why the Agency has
promoted privacy policies, despite their problems (and despite the
fact that they do not appear to promote the interests of any indus-
try groups whose favor the FTC might be seeking). It is through
privacy policies that the FTC is gaining jurisdiction over the com-
mercial Internet. Jurisdiction is power. In other words, the FTC
acts as if it has a plan to migrate its activities to the Internet, and
privacy policies have been at the core of this plan. Following is the
reason why the FTC has been able to obtain a more secure jurisdic-
tional foothold by means of privacy policies.
First, the intellectual property status of personal data must
be taken into account. The key legal fact is that data gathering and
use of the sort widely complained about is legal. Personal data is
data. In general, data is not subject to ownership. 52 This means that
parties without the host sites disclosing this practice. There are also instances where personally
identified data is transferred to third parties in direct violation of stated privacy policies." Id.
49. See Bedell, supra note 47 (arguing that because privacy is not being adequately pro-
tected, federal intervention to enforce legal standards may be necessary). According to EPIC,
"[n]ot one of the companies [surveyed] adequately addressed all the elements of fair information
practices." Id.
50. See William J. Scheibal & Julia Alpert Gladstone, Privacy on the Net: Europe Changes
the Rules, BuSINESS HoRIzoNs, May 1, 2000, at 13, available at 2000 WL 20177264. 'Each coun-
try is required to create or designate at least one public authority to monitor and enforce its
privacy laws. As this is written, at least four EU countries-Greece, Italy, UK, and Belgium-
have passed the appropriate legislation, and the others must do so within six months" Id.
51. See Mo Krochmal, Privacy Czar Warns Regulation Is Still Possible, CMP TECHWEB,
Mar. 5, 1999, available at 1999 WL 2493752.
52. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348, 359-60 (1991);
Mell, supra note 3, at 27; Laudon, supra note 3. This is true despite the fact that as a matter of
the reigning social norms of the situation, such data gathering activities are morally suspect at
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the FTC will find it problematic to enforce against websites for
merely gathering and processing personal data, however unfair
such practices may seem. The Agency has a good deal of discretion
with regard to the enforcement actions it brings.53 Thus, in princi-
ple, it could bring enforcement actions against websites merely on
the basis of "unfair" practices. 54
There are two problems in doing so, however, a practical
problem and a political problem. The practical problem is one of
over-inclusion. The FTC had defined "fair" information practices so
broadly that many thousands of websites-most commercial web-
sites, in fact-would be subject to enforcement actions under the'
FTC's definition of unfair information practices. 55 The political
problem is that, in general, the mood in Washington, both with the
Republican Congress and the Democratic administration, has been
in favor of governmental non-interference with the Internet.56 Thus,
best and violations of human rights at the worst. "[Ihe right to be left alone [is] the most com-
prehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men." Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also Maureen S. Dorney, Privacy and the
Internet, 19 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 635, 639 (1997) (explaining that because the Constitu-
tion primarily regulates government action, it does not "generally restrict:' private party collec-
tion and use of personal information).
53. See generally Angela J. Campbell, Self-Regulation and the Media, 51 FED. COMM. L.J.
711 (1999) (raising concerns about exercise of unreviewable discretion).
54. The FTC prosecutes "[u]nfair methods of competition.., and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce" under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
('FTCA"). 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1994). Section 13(b) authorizes the prosecution of actions to en-
force Section 5. See id. § 57b(a). Section 18 permits the FTC to create rules to prohibit deceptive
or unfair practices prevalent in certain industries. See id. § 57a(a).
55. See FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES, supra note 7, at ii. The FTCs 2000 Survey analyzed
the nature and substance of privacy disclosures in light of the fair information practice principles
of Notice, Choice, Access, and Security. "It found that only 20% of Web sites in the Random
Sample that collect personal identifying information implement, at least in part, all four fair
information practice principles... [Tihe percentage of Web sites that state that they are pro-
viding protection in the core areas remains low." Id.
56.
As outlined in his Directive on Electronic Commerce, President Clinton in-
structed the Department of Commerce and the Office of Management and
Budget to lead the Administration's privacy efforts and to encourage private
industry and privacy advocacy groups to adopt effective self-regulatory ap-
proaches to protect privacy on the Internet. . . . [The Clinton Administration.
has expressed concern that] the nature of the Internet makes legislative and
regulatory privacy protections less effective on-line.
Internet Privacy and Electronic Communications: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts and
Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1998) (statements of
David L. Aaron, Under Secretary, International Trade Administration, Dep't. of Commerce),
available at 1998 WL 8993806. David L. Aaron stated:
[o]n the World Wide Web, new sites appear and others disappear at an aston-
ishing rate. Congress could certainly pass a law mandating privacy protections
on-line, for example, but enforcement of such a law, even if possible, might re-
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the FTC would have been well advised to demonstrate circumspec-
tion in regulating this popular new industry.
For the foregoing reasons, we see that the FTC, qua enter-
prise, has good cause to go out of its way to promote privacy poli-
cies, despite the fact that they are problematic, in terms of their
ability to promote informational privacy. The reason is that the
FTC thereby increases its jurisdictional grasp over the activities of
online enterprises. Previously, it was on shaky ground to bring en-
forcement actions under a vague theory of "unfair" trade practices. 57
But once websites offer privacy policies, the Agency can more read-
ily bring enforcement actions. 58 Once websites make explicit state-
ments on their websites regarding their informational practices,
they are then in a position in which they must either live up to
those promises or open themselves up to the charge of engaging in
deceptive trade practices. 59 Making representations to consumers,
and then acting contrary to these representations, is apparently the
sort of behavior the FTC is more inclined to take action against.
The FTC's promotion of privacy policies is instructively viewed as
an attempt to cause websites to make quasi-contractual statements
in writing. The more contractual these statements are, the more
enforceable they will be.
quire enormous resources. We don't want to give Internet users a false sense of
security based on an unenforceable law.
Id. Over the past five years, the notion of the self-regulating Internet has received support in
the mainstream media as well. "The Online Privacy Alliance, an ad-hoc group of 100 companies
that includes America Online, Intel, and Yahoo!," argues that recent laws, "such as the Chil-
dren's Online Privacy Protection Act [COPPA] .... [along with] changing industry practices
make additional legislation unnecessary." Jennifer Tanaka, Guarding Online Privacy: Do You
Know 1ho's Watching as You Surf the Web?, NEWSWEEK, June 5, 2000, at 77, 77, available at
2000 WL 21083216. In addition, the influential first-generation Internet cognicenti have been
virulently anti-regulation. Such preferences can be expected to filter into the political decision-
making process to some extent.
57. See 15 U.S.C. § 57b(a) (1994) ("If any person, partnership, or corporation violates
any rule ... respecting unfair or deceptive acts or practices .... then the Commission may
commence a civil action.. ").
58. See Weingast & Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion, supra note 10, at 784 C'One of the key
policy instruments available to the FTC is its choice of cases.").
59. See Special Committee to Study the Role of the Federal Trade Commission, Report of the
American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 43, 68 (1989) ("The Com-
mission's unfairness authority has long been a source of controversy. Some, but not all, contro-
versy ended with the Commission issuing its policy statement on its consumer unfairness juris-
diction."). In short, this policy statement says that consumer injury is the central element in a
finding of unfairness. The injury must be found to be substantial, not reasonably avoidable by
the consumer, and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or competition. See
Letter from FTC to Senators Ford and Danforth (Dec. 17, 1980), available at (FTC Policy State-
ment on Unfairness) http://ftc.gov/bcp/policystmtad-unfair.htm.
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The Agency has never brought an enforcement action against
a website merely for "unfair" trade practices. In the past few years,
a number of enforcement actions have been brought, all in situa-
tions in which a website had made statements in writing with re-
gard to data collection practices. In its first online privacy enforce-
ment action, the FTC charged Geocities, a site that is home to per-
sonal web pages and has over two-million members, with misrepre-
senting the purposes for which it was collecting personal identifying
information. 60 The FTC's most recent online privacy enforcement
action was brought against Toysmart to stop it from violating its
privacy policy.61 The site had represented to consumers that per-
sonal information would never be shared with third parties. Once in
bankruptcy proceedings, however, the site sought to sell its data-
base of personal information.
Therefore, it is clear that once websites provide privacy poli-
cies, the FTC will be in a position to exercise its deceptive practices
jurisdiction if those policies are not followed. By encouraging web-
sites to provide privacy policies in the first place, the FTC has cre-
ated a situation in which it is now able to extend its enforcement
jurisdiction onto the Internet.
Consider next the extent to which the website industry, or
some subset thereof, may have been the beneficiary of the FTC's
promotion of privacy policies. Public choice theorists have observed
across a variety of different contexts and industries the manner by
which industry interests are served by agencies. Two common sce-
narios are where large firms are favored over small firms, and
where firms from favored political districts are favored over other
firms.62 In addition, a whole industry may receive preferential
treatment.
With regard to websites of different sizes, as we saw, it was
the large firms that were most likely to adopt more respectful pri-
vacy practices. Large sites would prefer to not have to offer privacy
policies. Hence, it is hard to argue that the FTC's actions are
geared to promote the interests of large websites over small web-
sites.
60. See FTC, Internet Site Agrees to Settle FTC Charges of Deceptively Collecting Personal
Information in Agency's First Internet Privacy Case (Aug. 13, 1998),
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1998/9808/geocitie.htm.
61. See FTC, FTC Announces Settlement with Bankrupt Website, Toysmart.com, Regarding
Alleged Privacy Policy Violations (July 21, 2000), http://www.ftc.gov/opaI2000/07/toysmart2.htm.
62. See PUBLIC CHOICE & REGULATION, supra note 10, at 9.
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With regard to whether firms from favored political districts
are receiving favorable treatment, there is little data from which to
draw conclusions. There have been five enforcement actions so far.63
These firms are GeoCities, Liberty Financial, Toysmart, Rever-
seAuction.com, and Focus Medical Group. These firms are from a
number of districts and regions, and accordingly it is hard to draw
the conclusion that the FTC is engaged in selective enforcement.
Seemingly, no congressional district is receiving special treat-
ment.64
The FTC's actions do, however, hurt some sites more than
other websites. The firms that will be most adversely affected are
those that had previously taken greatest advantage of the free
availability of personal data. Thus, while the emergence of a pri-
vacy policy norm is neutral on its face, it has a disparate and pre-
dictable impact on websites depending on their informational prac-
tices. But it does not appear that the set of firms most affected
comes from any particular district or region.
Finally, it might be that a whole industry is being shown fa-
vor. Failure to regulate can be a form of favor. One might initially
observe that this was the case with websites, as the FTC has said
much in favor of website industry self-regulation.65 Based on what
we saw in Part Two, however, it is more accurate to describe the
situation as one in which the Agency has talked the talk of self-
regulation, all the while moving to exert increasing regulatory con-
trol, first, by means of its regulation of privacy policies, and second,
by recommending to Congress that it enact a statute that the
Agency could then enforce. 66 Thus, while the FTC did indeed sup-
port industry self-enforcement previously, it appears now to have
63. See Privacy Initiatives, supra note 20 (providing links to information about the online
privacy cases).
64. The Commission has presented its Online Privacy Reports to the Committee on Com-
merce, Science, and Transportation of the United States Senate, and to the Committee on Com-
merce of the United States House of Representatives. See FTC, FTC Releases Report on Consum-
ers' Online Privacy (June 4, 1998), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1998/9806/privacy2.htm.
Sen. John McCain and Rep. Thomas Bliley chair the two committees, respectively. See PRIVACY
ONLINE, supra note 22, at 45 n.1. Both McCain and Bliley have proven to be active privacy advo-
cates, speaking on the subject at numerous committee hearings. See, e.g., Internet Privacy: Hear-
ing Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Sen. John McCain,
Chairman, Senate Commerce Comm.), available at 2000 WL 19305018.
65. See SELF REGULATION, supra note 16 and accompanying text.
66. See FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES, supra note 7, at 36. 'The majority recommends that
Congress give rulemaking authority to an 'implementing agency' (presumably the Commission)
.. " Id. at 1 (dissenting statement of Commissioner Orson Swindle).
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been merely biding its time until conditions became more favorable
for extending its jurisdiction.67
It is worthwhile to conclude with a brief discussion of the
relationship between the FTC's entrepreneurial activities and the
public interest. It may be plausible to suppose that the FTC can
enhance its jurisdiction by catering to a general public demand for
more respectful privacy practices by websites. There must be, how-
ever, a causal connection between general consumer preferences
and the actions of the FTC. Political entrepreneurs may provide the
causal nexus.
One of the functions of political entrepreneurs is to seek to
turn informal norms into formal legal rules. 68 Other things being
equal, there will be greater pressure pushing for the formalization
of an informal norm the more strongly held the informal norm and
the more politically powerful the set of conformers to the norm.
With privacy norms, there is a growing public pressure in the direc-
tion of greater electronic privacy.69 This pressure must manifest
itself in some tangible way that can be felt by the FTC. Recently,
Congress has been the source of this pressure.
There is growing bipartisan support in Congress for privacy.
Members of Congress are entrepreneurs themselves who sometimes
find it in their interest to serve the interests of their constituents.
There is a growing pressure on them to address online privacy con-
67. See id. CThe majority abandons a self-regulatory approach in favor of extensive gov-
ernment regulation, despite continued progress in self-regulation.").
68. See ELLICKSON, supra note 39, at 4-6; ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 141-47
(2000).
69. 'The Pew Internet & American Life Project surveyed 2,117 Americans, 1,017 of whom
are Internet users, ... about trust and privacy online." See Susannah Fox et al, Trust and Pri-
uacy Online: Why Americans Want to Rewrite the Rules (Aug. 20, 2000), at 2,
http://www.pewinternet.org/reports/toc.asp?Report-19. The results of this survey indicate that:
The vast majority of American Internet users want the privacy playing field
tilted towards them and away from online companies. They think it is an inva-
sion of their privacy for these businesses to monitor users' Web browsing. By a
two-to-one margin they reject the argument made by some firms that Web
tracking can be helpful....
86% of Internet users are in favor of "opt-in" privacy policies that require
the Internet companies to ask people for permission to use personal informa-
tion....
54% of Internet users believe that Web sites' tracking of users is harmful
because it invades their privacy.
Id. As part of their marketing strategies, firms that sell so-called "privacy solutions," that is,
software to protect consumer privacy, are attempting to create moral outrage on the part of con-
sumers over the privacy issue. This increases demand on congressional norm entrepreneurs.
See Hetcher, supra note 40.
2060 [Vol. 53:6:2041
2000] THE FTC AS PRIVACYNORM ENTREPRENEUR 2061
cerns.70 Thus, the FTC can feel safer than usual in taking the ini-
tiative on privacy as it does not risk alienating either of the politi-
cal parties. Since both parties are increasingly in favor of privacy,
the Agency does not have to worry about aligning itself with a fac-
tion that will fall out of the ascendancy. 71
What we see, then, is that public demand for greater infor-
mational privacy may be translated into political demand for pri-
vacy, and the FTC may be able to harness this demand in order to
draw support for its efforts to increase its regulatory grasp over the
Internet. Whether the public interest is thereby served is not clear.
Serious consideration of this issue is beyond the purview of this Ar-
ticle. Answering this question would require a cost/benefit analysis
as to whether the FTC is the least cost provider of online privacy.72
What we have seen here is merely that the FTC has contrived to be
a provider, not that it is the best provider.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article considered the FTC's role as a norm entrepre-
neur. Pursuant to the Federal Trade Commission Act, the FTC
regulates unfair and deceptive trade practices. Unfairness, per se,
is too uncertain of a standard to seek enforcement actions against
websites that take data without notice or consent, however. But
once websites are induced to make representations in writing via
privacy policies, then it is easier for the FTC to seek enforcement
actions for deceptive trade practices. Thus, the public choice expla-
nation of the Agency's promotion of privacy policies is that this ac-
tivity allows the Agency to increase its jurisdiction.
70. See Richard L. Berke, What Are You Afraid of? A Hidden Issue Emerges, N.Y. TIMES,
June 4, 2000, § 4, at 1.
71. One of the most dramatic episodes in the FTC's history occurred due to a change in the
political winds. The Agency pursued an activist agenda in the 1960s and early 1970s. Subse-
quently, however, a more conservative Congress took over, cut the FTC's funding, and precipi-
tated a crisis at the Agency. See supra note 15.
72. In his dissent to the FTC's 2000 Report to Congress, Commissioner Swindle excoriates
the Agency for failing to perform rudimentary cost/benefit analysis prior to recommending sig-
nificant new legislation. See FAIR INFORMATION PRAcTICES, supra note 7, at 1-2. He states:
[m]ost disturbing, the Privacy Report is devoid of any consideration of the costs
of legislation in comparison to the asserted benefits of enhancing consumer con-
fidence and allowing electronic commerce to reach its full potential. Instead, it
relies on skewed descriptions of the results of the Commission's 2000 Survey
and studies showing consumer concern about privacy as the basis for a re-
markably broad legislative recommendation. It does not consider whether leg-
islation will address consumer confidence problems and why legislation is pref-
erable to alternative approaches that rely on market forces, industry efforts,
and enforcement of existing laws.
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This Article considered and rejected the supposition that the
FTC's purported efforts to promote industry self-regulation might
indicate that the Agency has been captured by industry. While the
Agency has seemed to promote industry self-regulation, it has all
the while been establishing the predicate for its jurisdictional grasp
over website activities. Because the FTC is able to gain a jurisdic-
tional foothold by means of promoting more respected website pri-
vacy norms, the Agency is aptly characterized as a privacy norm
entrepreneur.
